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1 Introduction
Does unanimity favor the formation of large and conservative groups? Does
majority favor the formation of small and pro-active groups? These two ques-
tions echo the general theme of this paper: the role of groups’ governance
on their sizes, compositions and inclinations to change status quo. Many
human activities are naturally organized in groups, alliances, partnerships
or coalitions: World Trade Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, European Monetary Union, law groups, ﬁsheries, marriages, industry
cartels, just to name a few.1 Arguably, the main rationale for individuals to
form groups is to beneﬁt from eﬃciency gains such as economies of scale,
exchanges of information, transfer of knowledge, specialization. Another es-
sential feature is that the decisions a group takes are often partly out of
control of individuals composing the group or, in the hands of a few of its
members: a board of shareholders, a hiring committee, etc. And the gover-
nance of a group precisely determines the extent to which members of the
group inﬂuence the decisions the group takes. For instance, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) uses a weighted voting scheme to adopt decisions, and
requires a majority of 85 % of votes to adopt major decisions. With a weight
of over 17 %, the governance of the IMF eﬀectively grants a veto power to
the United States of America, on the one hand. On the other hand, only 15
% is required to veto a proposal by the United States (See Leech (2002).) As
another example, a quorum of 16 votes out of 20 is required for the board of
shareholders of Le Monde to appoint a director. (See Le Monde, 23/05/2007.)
Consequently, a group might take decisions that some of its members
would not have taken on their own. In this paper, we interpret the diﬀerence
in payoﬀs resulting from the decisions a group takes and the ones an indi-
vidual would have taken on their own as a cost associated with the loss of
control over the group decisions. And the governance of a group determines
the magnitude of this implicit cost. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First,
it aims at analyzing the formation of a group as the trade-oﬀ between eﬃ-
ciency gains and the cost associated with the partial loss of control over the
decisions a group takes. Second, it analyzes how the governance of a group
aﬀects its size, composition and propensity to change a status quo.
1In this paper, the word “group” is used generically for groups, alliances, coalitions,
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To highlight the prevalence of this trade-oﬀ, let us consider several ex-
amples. The ﬁrst series of examples concerns the formation of international
organizations. For instance, beneﬁts from joining the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) include access to markets without discrimination, increased
specialization and more coordinated trade policies. Decisions WTO takes are
governed by qualiﬁed majority rules.2 Thus, the WTO might take a decision,
say to maintain a trade tariﬀ, that some of its members would have abol-
ished. Another example is the European Council. When taking decisions on
particularly sensitive areas such as asylum, taxation and the common foreign
and security policy, the Council must be in unanimous agreement. Being an
European member is, however, beneﬁcial as it implies economies of scale
and more coordinated policies. Similar considerations apply to the IMF or
the European Monetary Union (Kohler (2002)).3 Second, in industrial orga-
nization, cartels and research ventures are examples of groups that beneﬁt
from economies of scale. For instance, Nocke (1999) studies the formation of
cartels when ﬁrms face capacity constraints. Firms in a cartel beneﬁt from
increased capacity. Similarly, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien
and Zang (1993), study the formation of cooperative research ventures where
ﬁrms beneﬁt from cost-reduction.4 In all these examples, the decisions a car-
tel takes e.g., which R&D projects to ﬁnance, are often compromises resulting
from lengthly negotiations, and are likely to diﬀer from the decision a single
ﬁrm might take on its own. As a last example, individuals often invest in
asset funds not only to economize on monitoring, legal, or screening costs
but also to share risks. However, the investment decisions i.e., the portfolio
allocations, the fund management takes is likely to diﬀer from the decision
an individual would take due to diﬀerent attitudes toward risks, opinions or
time horizons. (See Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Genicot
and Ray (2003).)
We propose a simple model with costly actions to analyze the conse-
quences in terms of size, composition, and likelihood to change the status
quo of the above trade-oﬀ. In the model, individuals can either participate
2The WTO continues GATTs tradition of making decisions not by voting but by con-
sensus. Where consensus is not possible, the WTO agreement allows for voting. The WTO
Agreement envisages several speciﬁc situations involving voting, which are governed either
by the unanimity rule, or a two-thirds majority rule or a three-quarters majority rule.
3Maggi and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2006) develop a model of self-enforcing voting that ex-
plains most of the modes of governance encountered in international organizations.
4For further examples, we refer the reader to Bloch (2003).Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 3
in a group or stand alone, and we assume that individuals have private val-
uations over two alternatives x and y, y being the status quo. Beneﬁts to
participate in a group are modelled as cost reduction: the more individu-
als in the group, the lower the cost per individual of taking action x or y
is. Historically, groups have adopted a large variety of governances ranging
from unanimity, qualiﬁed majority to consensus and many more (see Felsen-
thal and Machover (1998)). In this paper, we assume that the governance
takes the form of a voting system, a practice adopted by many international
organizations and boards of shareholders. More precisely, we assume that a
quorum of ω(n) ≤ n votes is required to change the status quo in a group of
n individuals. For instance, unanimity corresponds to ω(n) = n and simple
majority to ω(n) = (n + 1)/2 if n is odd, and n/2 if n is even.
To get some intuitions on the results, assume that it is costless to maintain
the status quo, and that the cost of changing it is equally shared among
members of the group. On the one hand, consider an individual who prefers
the alternative x over the status quo y. If he participates in a group of
n individuals and alternative x is voted, then he is better oﬀ because of
the economies of scale. However, if the group maintains the status quo, he
is worse oﬀ. On the other hand, suppose that the same individual rather
prefers y over x unless he shares the cost with at least n∗ other individuals.
The risk for him is now to join a group with less than n∗ individuals and
x being voted. Consequently, upon deciding whether to join a group, an
individual has to trade-oﬀ the potential cost reduction with the potential
risk that his less preferred alternative is chosen. This trade-oﬀ implies, in
turn, that individuals with “similar” valuations form the group; more extreme
individuals stand on their own.
As alluded above, the governance of a group is clearly instrumental in
determining the likelihood that the less preferred alternative of an individual
is implemented and, therefore, inﬂuences the composition and size of the
group. For instance, with unanimity, individuals who prefer the status quo on
their own are weakly better oﬀ by participating in a group: they can always
veto the adoption of x if the group is not large enough to make a change
of status quo attractive. Furthermore, if those individuals are numerous
enough, then even the individuals preferring a change of status quo join
the group. Indeed, the strong economies of scale now oﬀset the risk of the
status quo to be maintained. And, as the group gets larger and larger,
changing the status quo becomes more and more attractive. This suggestsGroups and governance, June 18, 2007 4
that unanimity, often blamed for the European inertia of the last two decades,
is only a scapegoat: the true culprit is the lack of synergies among European
countries.
Related literature. This paper is part of the abundant literature on
coalition formation games. One part of this literature uses stregic-form games
which are reduced form models, useful when the objective is not the anal-
ysis of the emergence of agreements but the analysis of their stability. The
ﬁrst ancestral exclusive membership game was proposed by Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) in their seminal book which marked the beginning of
game theory (see also Hart and Kurz (1983)). At the same time, d’Aspremont
et al. (1983) proposed a simpler game with an open-membership rule, which
opened the way for numerous applications to industrial organization (see
Bloch (2003)) and environmental economics (e.g., Barrett (1994)). A paral-
lel literature uses extensive form games which allow one to describe, some
aspects of the bargaining leading to the agreement. See for example Bloch
(1996), or Ray and Vohra (1999, 2001). The present paper follows the ap-
proach of d’Aspremont et al., in that the group formation game is modelled
as an open membership game with incomplete information, however. More
closely related is the literature on the formation of clubs and the provision of
local public goods (e.g., Casella (1992), Jehiel and Scotchmer (1997, 2001)).
In this literature, as in the present paper, an individual trades oﬀ the beneﬁt
to participate in a group (sharing the cost of providing a public good) with
the “risk” that the group provides a sub-optimal level of the public good
from the individual perspective. The paper diﬀers from this literature in two
important respects, however. First, the group formation game is explicitly
modelled and analyzed. Second, and more importantly, the main focus of the
paper is the interplay between the internal mode of governance of a group,
and its size, composition, and propensity to change the status quo. To the
best of my knowledge, this has not been the focus of the aforementioned liter-
ature. Finally, we can cite the literature on the formation of political parties
e.g., Besley and Coate (1997), Levy (2004), Osborne and Tourky (2005).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The
equilibrium analysis is exposed in Section 3, while Section 4 contains the
main results of the paper on governance and groups. Section 5 concludes.
Proofs are collected in the Appendix.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 5
2 A model of group formation
We consider a model with costly actions and N individuals. Individuals can
form a group to beneﬁt from cost reduction. However, the decision the group
takes might diﬀer from the decision any individual would have taken on their
own: this is an implicit cost to join a group. The group governance partly
determines this implicit cost and, consequently, its size, composition and
inclination to change the status quo.
Formally, individuals not participating in the group and the group have
to decide, each, whether to maintain the status quo (action y) or to change
it (action x). For simplicity, we normalize the payoﬀ of the status quo to
zero. Taking action x yields a beneﬁt to individual i of θibx with bx > 0.
Natural interpretations of our model include: adopting a new standard or
technology, choosing whether to ﬁnance an investment in a ﬁnancial asset or
a R&D project, and more broadly any political or economic decision. The
parameter θi ∈ [0,1] is individual i’s private valuation of the beneﬁt of taking
action x. We assume that it is common knowledge that the (θi)i=1,...,N are the
realizations of the random variables (˜ θi)i=1,...,N independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) with distribution µ. Unless indicated otherwise, µ is
assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Furthermore, changing the status quo is costly. We can think of this cost
as an administrative cost, the cost to gather and process information, the cost
to implement the new technology, etc. The cost to take action x is cx(n) per
individual in a group of n members. We assume that cx(·) is non-increasing
in n, and cx(1) = cx.5 For instance, if the cost to take action x is ﬁxed, the
group might share it among its n members. Thus, if an individual is member
of a group composed of n individuals and the group takes action x, his payoﬀ
is θibx − cx(n), higher than the payoﬀ he gets if he takes action x on their
own. By joining a group, an individual beneﬁts from economies of scale (cost
reduction).
5All our results go through if we assume bx > by, cx(n) > cy(n) for each n, and
cx(n) − cy(n) decreasing in n, with obvious notations.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 6
2.1 Governance
A central feature of the model is the governance of a group. Historically,
groups have adopted a large variety of governances ranging from voting to
consensus without vote (NATO) and many more. Voting, however, is the
most common form of governances. We therefore consider voting as the
modes of governance in this paper. More speciﬁcally, we assume that a
quorum of ω(n) votes is required to adopt decision x i.e., to change the
status quo, in a group of n individuals. For instance, if ω(n) = n for any n,
a group changes the status quo only if all its members unanimously agree to
do so, while if ω(n) = (n + 1)/2 if n is odd and ω(n) = n/2 if n is even, a
simple majority is required to change the status quo. We can already note
that since there are only two alternatives x and y, sincere voting is weakly
dominant regardless of the type of an individual. We focus on equilibria
featuring sincere voting in the rest of the paper.
The governance of a group (social choice rule) selects the decision that
a “qualiﬁed” majority of its members prefer. An alternative for the group
would be to select the decision that is ex-post eﬃcient, that is, to select x if
bx(
P
i∈Group θi) ≥ ncx(n) and y, otherwise. Does it exist a mechanism that
implements this rule? The short answer is no: an ex-post eﬃcient, budget-
balanced, incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism does not
exist in our framework (See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). Note that with
this alternative, the implicit cost to join the group would have been nil.
2.2 Forming a group
To focus on the interaction between modes of governance, composition and
group sizes, we consider a (very) simple two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, all
individuals simultaneously decide either to participate in a unique group, or
to stand-alone (open membership game). In the second stage, the members
of the group vote for an action to be taken by the group. The stand-alone
individuals also choose between x and y. While our model abstracts from in-
teresting aspects of group formation e.g., dynamic formation, entry and exit,
multiple groups, it incorporates most of the ingredients to meaningfully study
the interaction between group formation and modes of governance. We canGroups and governance, June 18, 2007 7
also note that the group is externally and internally stable in equilibrium.6
3 A numerical example
This section is under revision. A new example will be provided soon.
Before analyzing the model, we present a simple numerical example with
three individuals that illustrates some of our results. Assume that µ is the
uniform distribution on [0,1], bx = 1, cx(1) = 0.38, cx(2) = 0.25 and cx(3) =
0.16. If an individual stands alone, he takes either action x and gets a payoﬀ
of θi − 0.38 or action y and gets a payoﬀ of 0. His payoﬀ to stand alone
is therefore max(0,θi − 0.38). What is the expected payoﬀ of an individual
if he decides to participate in a group? Let us assume that equilibrium
strategies si : [0,1] → {0,1}, where “0” stands for “stand alone” and “1” for
“participate,” are the indicator of some interval [θ,θ].7
Unanimity. With unanimity, the group adopts decision x if only if all
its members unanimously agree to do so, that is, ω(n) = n for n ∈ {1,2,3}.
Moreover, individual i is pivotal in a group of n individuals in the event that
n − 1 individuals (conditional on being in the group) vote for x. That is,
individual i is pivotal in a group of n with probability Pr(θjbx − cx(n) ≥
0|θj ∈ [θ,θ])n−1. Lastly, the probability that n − 1 individuals other than
i participates in the group follows a binomial distribution with parameters
((θ − θ),N − 1). Henceforth, the expected payoﬀ of an individual of type θi
to participate in the group with unanimity is given by:
E
1
una(θi,θ,θ) = (1 − (θ − θ))
2 max(0,θi − 0.38)+













We can ﬁrst note that if θ = θ, an individual is indiﬀerent between partic-
ipating in a group or standing alone. It follows that standing alone is an
equilibrium of this game. Besides these trivial equilibria, there exist other
6Formally, assume that any individual i can either locate at G or {i} where G stands for
the group. In equilibrium, no individual has an incentive to deviate to another location.
7We will show that this is indeed the case in any equilibrium.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 8
equilibria. For instance, there is an equilibrium with (θ,θ) = (0,1). And the
probability to change the status quo is around 0.60 (0.843).
Majority. With three individuals, majority diﬀers from unanimity only
in the event that all the three individuals participate in the group. Moreover,
an individual is pivotal in a group of 3 in the event that exactly one of the
two other individuals vote for x. The expected payoﬀ of an individual of type
θi to participate in a group with majority is therefore:
E
1
maj(θi,θ,θ) = (1 − (θ − θ))
2 max(0,θi − 0.38)+

























una(θi,θ,θ) for all θi < 0.16 and E1
maj(θi,θ,θ) >
E1
una(θi,θ,θ) for all θi > 0.38. An equilibrium with majority is (θ,θ =
(0.16,0.82) and the probability to change the status quo is around 0.88.
4 Cost reduction versus loss of control
Notation: Hereafter, ]a,a[ denotes the open interval with endpoints a and
a while (a,a) denotes the point in R2 with coordinates a and a.
In the next two sections, we analyze the group formation game for a
given governance. And Section 5 will study how equilibria vary as the mode
of governance changes. For simplicity, we only consider symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. We now consider the problem an individual faces in
taking his decision whether to participate in a group or to stand-alone.
Suppose that individual i participates in a group of n individuals. If
individual i is pivotal (i.e., if he expects exactly ω(n) − 1 members of the
group to vote for x), his payoﬀ is max(θibx − cx(n),0) since by voting x the
group takes decision x, and individual i’s payoﬀ is then θibx − cx(n), while
it is 0 if he votes y. Hence, whether individual i, whenever pivotal, takes
action x or y depends on his type (valuation) and the number of individuals
participating in the group. If individual i is not pivotal, his vote does notGroups and governance, June 18, 2007 9
inﬂuence the decision of the group, and his payoﬀ is θibx−cx(n) if more than
ω(n) members of the group other than himself vote for x, and 0 otherwise.
Let s : [0,1] → {0,1}, θi 7→ s(θi) be a symmetric equilibrium function,







0 if cx(n) ≤ 0,
cx(n)
bx if bx > cx(n) > 0,
1 if cx(n) ≥ bx.
(1)
For bx > cx(n) > 0, θn is the type of an individual that would be indiﬀerent
between action x and y in a group of n individuals. Note that θn is decreasing
in the number n of group members and increasing in the cost cx of action x.
Any member of a group composed of n individuals votes for x if and only
if θi ≥ θn. Therefore, the probability β(n,s) that individual j votes for x,













It follows that the probability that exactly m out of n−1 individuals, other
than i, vote for x follows a binomial density with parameters (β(n,s),n−1).
Note that β(·,·) depends on the group size and its composition. We denote
αn−1(m,s) the probability that exactly m individuals, other than i, vote for
x in a group of n. In particular, the probability that individual i is pivotal
in a group of n individuals is








The probability to be pivotal therefore depends on the mode of governance
ω(n), the size of the group n, and its composition i.e., the set of types that
join the group. The probability that any individual j 6= i joins the group in
a symmetric equilibrium is µ({θj ∈ [0,1] : s(θj) = 1}) and since types are
i.i.d., the probability that exactly (n − 1) individuals other than i join the
group is
ϕ(n − 1,s) := [µ({θj ∈ [0,1] : s(θj) = 1})]
n−1 (3)







8If µ{p ∈ [0,1] : s(p) = 1} = 0, then β(·,s) ≡ 0.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 10
a binomial density with parameters (µ({θj ∈ [0,1] : s(θj) = 1}),N −1). The




n=1 ϕ(n − 1,s)[αn−1(ω(n) − 1,s)max(0,θibx − cx(n))
+(
Xn−1
m=ω(n) αn−1(m,s))(θibx − cx(n))].
Alternatively, if individual i of type θi stands alone, his expected payoﬀ is
E
0(θi) := max(0,θibx − cx(1)). (5)
Note that the expected payoﬀ to participate in a group is dependent on the
equilibrium strategy s. Thus, to characterize the equilibria, we should ﬁnd
a function s∗ such that s∗(pi) = 1 if and only if E1(θi,s∗) ≥ E0(θi), and
s∗(θi) = 0 if and only if E1(θi,s∗) ≤ E0(θi). Despite the simplicity of our
model, this task will turn out to be a diﬃcult one.
The trade-oﬀ between cost reduction and the cost associated with the loss
of control is not immediately apparent from equations (4) and (5). The next
equation highlights this trade-oﬀ by writing the diﬀerence in payoﬀs between





n=1 ϕ(n − 1,s)[max(0,θibx − cx(n)) − max(0,θibx − cx(1)]
+
XN
n=1 ϕ(n − 1,s)(
Xn−1
m=ω(n) αn−1(m,s))[(θibx − cx(n)) − max(0,θibx − cx(n))]
+
XN
n=1 ϕ(n − 1,s)(
Xω(n)−2
m=0 αn−1(m,s))[0 − max(0,θibx − cx(n))].
In Equation (6), the second line captures the economies of scale in partici-
pating in a group, and is positive. Ceteris paribus, the more individuals are
in the group, the higher the gains for individual i to participate in a group.
The third and fourth lines capture the cost associated with the loss of control
over the decision the group takes and their sum is negative. Conditional on
participating in a group of n individuals and not being pivotal, individual
i expects the group to take action x with probability
Xn−1
m=ω(n) αn−1(m,s)
and action y with probability
Xω(n)−2
m=0 αn−1(m,s). Moreover, his payoﬀ isGroups and governance, June 18, 2007 11
(θibx−cx(n)) if action x is taken and 0, otherwise. Were individual i pivotal,
his expected payoﬀ would be max(0,θibx − cx(n)). It follows that individual
i’s implicit cost to participate in the group is indeed given by the sum of the
third and fourth lines in Equation (6).
The group governance is thus instrumental in determining the cost of
(partly) losing control over the decision the group takes. Conditional on
being in a group of n individuals, the cost of losing control is increasing in
the quorum ω(n) if θi > θn, and decreasing in the quorum if θi < θn. Indeed,
if individual i’s type θi is greater than θn, he prefers action x to be chosen,
but a larger quorum makes it harder to change the status quo, hence to adopt
action x.
5 Equilibrium analysis
As a preliminary observation, note that a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium
of the group formation game exists. Intuitively, if each type of each individ-
ual conjectures that every type of the other individuals will not participate
in the group, then each type is indiﬀerent between standing alone and par-
ticipating, hence standing-alone is a best reply.9 Thus, there always exists
trivial equilibria in which any type of any individual stands alone. More-
over, observe that if cx(N) ≥ bx, then any function s : [0,1] → {0,1} is an
equilibrium function. Indeed, if the cost cx(N) of taking x in a group of N
individuals (the grand group) oﬀsets the gain bx to be made, then action y is
a strictly dominant action regardless of an individual’s type, and thus each
type of each individual is indiﬀerent between standing alone and participat-
ing in the group.10 Moreover, the payoﬀ to each individual is zero in any
of those equilibria. However, if cx(N) < bx, it might exist others equilibria.
The existence of such non-trivial equilibria is our next task.
9Formally, consider the strategy s∗(θi) = 0 for all θi ∈ [0,1]. It follows that E0 (θi) =
E1 (θi,s∗) for all types θi, hence it is a best reply for all types of each individual to stand
on their own.
10If we assume that, whenever indiﬀerent between standing alone and participating in
a group, an individual stands alone, then there exists a unique equilibrium in which any
type of any individual stands alone.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 12
5.1 Extreme types stand on their own
We ﬁrst start with an important result about the equilibrium functions s,
that is, equilibrium functions are the indicator of some intervals.
Proposition 1 All symmetric equilibrium functions s : [0,1] → {0,1} are
the indicator of some intervals ]θ,θ[ or [θ,θ] .
Proposition 1 states that any equilibrium has a double cutoﬀ nature: for
all types θi ∈ [0,1] such that θi ≤ θ and θi ≥ θ, an individual stands alone.11
Thus, extreme types do not participate in the group; individuals with “sim-
ilar” types form the group. The intuition behind this result is simple. The
higher θi, the higher individual i’s payoﬀ to participate in a group and to
stand-alone are. Furthermore, we can show that the diﬀerence of expected
payoﬀs E1(·,s) − E0 (·) is increasing for θi < θ1 and decreasing for θi ≥ θ1.
Thus, if we ﬁnd a “low” type θ and a “high” type θ such that these two
types are indiﬀerent between participating in the group and standing alone,
then every type in-between participates. This result drastically simpliﬁes
our problem: we will only need to focus on the change of θ and θ as ω(·)
varies to analyze the impact of group governances on the (expected) size and
composition of a group. Moreover, note that this result is reminiscent of
the literature on local public goods, which also ﬁnd that groups consist of
“connected” types.
Before going further, two observations are worth doing. First, individuals
with extremely low valuations (weakly) prefer to stand alone. More precisely,
participating in the group is a weakly dominated strategy for every types of
an individual with θi < θN, unless the mode of governance is unanimity. To
see this, note that for those types, action x is strictly dominated by action y
regardless of whether they stand alone or participate in a group of any size.
Thus, the mere possibility that the group takes action x implies that they
prefer to stand on their own: they have nothing to gain from participating
in a group. However, if the governance is unanimity, each of these types can
veto the adoption of x; participating in the group is then not dominated.
Hence, it follows that θ ≥ θN, unless the mode of governance is unanimity.
With unanimity, there might exist equilibria with θ < θN, however. To see
11For the beliefs θi = θ or θi = θ, an individual is indiﬀerent between participating
in the group and standing alone, hence standing alone is a best-reply. In the sequel, we
assume, for simplicity, that whenever indiﬀerent, an individual stands alone.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 13
this, let us consider a simple example. Suppose that there are two individuals
N = 2, µ is the uniform distribution on [0,1], bx = 1/2, cx(1) = 3/10, and
cx(2) = 1/4. We have that θ1 = 3/5 and θ2 = 1/2. We can then show that
the indicator function of [0,5/8] is an equilibrium. Moreover, the (expected)
group size is 5/4 and the probability that the group changes the status quo is
1/40. For the argument sake, suppose now that it suﬃces that one individual
votes for x to change the status quo. We obtain that the indicator function of
]1/2,1] is the unique non-trivial equilibrium function. Intuitively, since it is
a weakly dominated strategy for types below 1/2 (θ2) to join the group, each
individual knows that the types of his opponent that might join the group
is above 1/2, hence take action x in a group of size 2. It then follows that
there is no cost associated with the loss of control over the group’s decision,
while there are gains to be made from cost sharing.12 Moreover, the expected
group size is 1 and the probability that the group changes the status quo is
3/10.13 This simple example suggests that unanimity favors the formation of
large groups while majority favors the change of status quo. However, this
example does not illustrate a general principle: unanimity might also favor
a change of status quo. The intuition is simple. By favoring the formation
of very large groups, unanimity maximizes the gains to be made from cost
reduction. And, therefore, changing the status quo becomes more attractive.
The second observation is that not only individuals who would take ac-
tion x standing on their own, but also individuals who would take action y
standing on their own, join the group. Formally, we have θ < θ1 ≤ θ. (A
complete proof is found in Appendix.) For instance, it is easy to see that
any types of an individual in between θ2 and θ1 join the group. For those
types, the payoﬀ to stand-alone is zero, while their payoﬀ to be in a group
of two individuals or more is strictly positive. However, for individuals with
types in between θ3 and θ2, matters are more complicate as there is the risk
to be in a group of only two individuals and action x being taken (action x
has negative payoﬀ for those types), unless the mode of governance is una-
12Note that the proﬁle of strategy s(θi) = 1 if θi ∈]1/2,1] and s(θi) = 0, otherwise, is
rationalizable.
13Assuming cx(2) = 1/10, we have that the indicator of [0,1] is an equilibrium function
with unanimity and of [1/5,1] with majority. The probability to change the status quo
is 16/25 with unanimity and 19/25 with majority. The expected group size is 2 with
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nimity. Similarly, individuals with types above θ1 might join the group if the
likelihood of action y being chosen is suﬃciently small. Again, the likelihood
of an action to be taken depends on the governance.
We can now continue the equilibrium characterization. We ﬁrst take ad-
vantage of Proposition 1 to rewrite the problem of determining s. From
Proposition 1, it follows that knowing the open interval ]θ,θ[ is isomorphic
to knowing the strategy s, and, thus, we substitute s by θ,θ in Equations (2)-
(4). Moreover, we have that the probability that any individual participates
in the group is µ(]θ,θ[) since {p ∈ [0,1] : s(p) = 1} =]θ,θ[ in a symmetric
equilibrium. Hence, the probability that exactly (n − 1) individuals other
than i participate in the group follows a binomial density with parameters
(µ(]θ,θ[),N −1). Quite naturally, we now characterize a non-trivial equilib-
rium as the zero of a map, and show that such a zero exists. Deﬁne the map
Γ : Σ :=

















Note that the map Γ is a continuous function of θ and θ. An equilibrium
(θ,θ) is the solution of (θ,1 − θ) · Γ(θ,θ) ≥ 0, with Γ(θ,θ) = 0 if (θ,θ) 6=
(0,1). As already mentioned, the set

(θ,θ) : θ = θ
	
is contained in Γ−1(0) := 
(θ,θ) : Γ(θ,θ) = 0
	
.14 Moreover, it is easy to show that these points are
critical points, that is to say, the Jacobian of Γ evaluated in

(θ,θ) : θ = θ
	
does not have full rank. A non-trivial equilibrium (θ,θ) is then a zero of
Γ, which does not belong to the set

(θ,θ) : θ = θ
	
, hence, in a non-trivial
equilibrium, the probability to participate in the group is strictly positive.
Theorem 1 If cx(N) < bx, there exists a non-trivial equilibrium.
Thus, if there are potential gains to form a group, an equilibrium exists
in which some types of individuals form a group. Several additional remarks
are worth doing.
First, if θ2 = 0, the grand group is the unique non-trivial equilibrium.
Intuitively, if θ2 = 0, that is if cx(2) = 0 or bx inﬁnitely large, every types
of any individual in a group of two individuals or more agree that the best
action is x. Since there is no disagreement over the best decision to take in a
14This is equivalent to s(θi) = 0 for all θi ∈ [0,1].Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 15
group, the grand group forms. Moreover, participating in a group is a weakly
dominant strategy. Second, if in two non-trivial equilibria, the probability to
participate in the group is the same, then these two equilibria are identical.
Lemma 1 If in two non-trivial equilibria (θ,θ) and (θ
0,θ
0
), the probability to
participate in the group is the same, i.e., µ(]θ,θ[) = µ(]θ
0,θ
0





In the previous discussion, we have shown that the group formation game
possesses trivial equilibria and, at least, one non-trivial equilibrium.15 This
multiplicity of equilibria should not be too disturbing: it rather nicely mirrors
the fascinating variety of forms that groups exhibit in real-life. In the sequel,
we nonetheless assume that individuals coordinate on a most comprehensive
equilibrium, as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium (θ
∗,θ
∗
) is said to be a most comprehensive equi-





Thus, in a most comprehensive equilibrium, the probability to participate
in the group is maximal. A desirable, if not essential, property of a selected
equilibrium is eﬃciency. For games of complete information, the concept of
eﬃciency is clearly deﬁned. However, for games of incomplete information,
as ours, the concept of eﬃciency becomes more diﬃcult to apprehend. In this
paper, we use the concepts of interim eﬃciency (see H¨ olmstr¨ om and Myerson
(1983)).16 If every individual prefers a given equilibrium over an alternative
equilibrium when he knows his type, whatever his type might be, then the
given equilibrium interim dominates the alternative one. And we say that
an equilibrium is interim eﬃcient if there exists no other equilibrium that
interim dominates it. Thus, interim eﬃciency is the appropriate concept
of eﬃciency for games of incomplete information in which the individuals
already know their type when the play of the game begins. We show that a
most comprehensive equilibrium has some appealing properties.
15In fact, the argument used to prove the existence of at least one non-trivial equilibrium
guarantees than there exists an odd number of non-trivial equilibria. Moreover, they are
locally unique.
16H¨ olmstr¨ om and Myerson make the distinction between classical eﬃciency and
incentive-compatible eﬃciency. In the paper, we refer to their concept of classical eﬃ-
ciency.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 16
Lemma 2 There exists a unique most comprehensive equilibrium. Moreover,
it is interim eﬃcient.
Uniqueness of the most comprehensive equilibrium follows from Lemma
1. As for eﬃciency, consider the most comprehensive equilibrium. For any
alternative equilibrium, there exists a set of types of positive measure par-
ticipating in the group in the most comprehensive equilibrium and standing-
alone in the alternative equilibrium; and these types of an individual obtain
a higher expected payoﬀ in the most comprehensive equilibrium. Therefore,
no alternative equilibrium can interim dominate the most comprehensive
equilibrium, hence the most comprehensive equilibrium is interim eﬃcient.
Besides interim eﬃciency, the most comprehensive equilibrium has another
interesting property: it minimizes the total expected cost under mild condi-
tions. Thus, the most comprehensive equilibrium would be the one selected
by a social planner, who aims at minimizing the total expected cost.
Proposition 2 Assume that the cost function satisﬁes: limn→+∞ cx(n) = 0,
ncx(n) is increasing in n, and limn→+∞ ncx(n) < +∞. There exists an inte-
ger b N such that for N > b N, the most comprehensive equilibrium minimizes
the total expected cost.
Note that if the cost cx of taking action x is equally shared among the
group members, i.e., cx(n) = cx/n, then the assumptions of Proposition 2
are satisﬁed. To ﬁx idea, suppose (for the time being) that all individuals
have chosen action x and there are n individuals in the group. The total
cost is (N −n)cx +ncx(n), a decreasing function of n. The more individuals
are in the group, the lower the total cost is. This is the main idea behind
Proposition 2. However, matters are more complex since the group might
choose with a higher probability action x than stand-alone individuals. In
other words, it is less costly for the group to take action x, but the group
might take action x more often. To get intuition for this result, compare














if all individuals participate in the group. We indeed have cost reduction
cx(N) < cx, but the group might take action x with a higher probabil-Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 17
ity. Hence, an extremely large group might not be socially eﬃcient. The
conditions stated in Proposition 2 insures that the largest group is socially
desirable, however.
6 Composition, size and governances
The aim of this section is to compare the composition, (expected) size and
likelihood to change the status quo of the most comprehensive group un-
der two important modes of governance: unanimity ω(n) = n and qualiﬁed
majority dn/2e ≤ ω(n) < n, for all n.
To start with, let us consider the unanimity rule. The payoﬀ to individual





n=1 ϕ(n − 1,s)αn−1(n − 1,s)max(0,θibx − cx(n)). (8)
From Eq. (8), we deduce that for all types θi ∈]θN,θ1] of individual i, it
is weakly dominant to participate in the group, while types in [0,θN] are
indiﬀerent. Indeed, with unanimity, each individual has the power to veto a
change of status quo, and therefore individuals with types below θ1 (weakly)
prefer to join the group. However, types above θ1 prefer the alternative x,
and joining a group entails the risk to be vetoed. Therefore, some might
join, some might not. For instance, consider the example with N = 3,
uniform distribution of types, bx = 1/2, cx(1) = 3/10, cx(2) = 1/4 and
cx(3) = 1/5, then the indicator function of [0,1] is the most comprehensive
equilibrium. And it clearly maximizes the size of the group. This simple
example illustrates an important aspect: unanimity favors the formation of
larger groups than majority.
Before presenting general results on governances and groups, let us con-
sider the simple case in which no individual on their own ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to change the status quo i.e., cx > bx (θ1 = 1). We already know from
the above arguments that θ una ≤ θN in any equilibrium with unanimity,
while θ maj > θN in any equilibrium with a qualiﬁed majority. Since θ1 = 1,
it follows that [0,1] is the most comprehensive equilibrium with unanimity.
With qualiﬁed majority, the most comprehensive equilibrium is [θmaj,1] with
θmaj > θN. We therefore have that the expected size of the group is larger
under unanimity than majority, a prediction that conﬁrms our intuition.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 18
Furthermore, we have the following result about the likelihood to change the
status quo.
Lemma 3 If bx > cx and limn→∞ cx(n) = 0, there exists a N such that for
N ≥ N, unanimity not only maximizes the expected size of the group, but
also the probability to change the status quo.
We already know that if cx > bx, unanimity favors the formation of larger
groups than majority. Moreover, if there are strong economies of scale in
forming large groups, unanimity induces more pro-active groups i.e., groups
with a higher probability to change the status quo. The intuition behind
this result is simple: whenever unanimity maximizes the expected size of the
group, it also maximizes the economies of scale. As a consequence, more
individuals are now willing to change the status quo. At the extreme, when
economies of scale become extremely large, all individuals ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to change the status quo and no one vetoes a change of status quo. By
favoring the formation of smaller groups, majority fails to capitalize on these
very large economies of scale.
We now turn to the general case in which some individuals ﬁnd it prof-
itable to change the status quo even standing on their own i.e., θ1 < 1.
The next proposition presents a condition under which unanimity favors the
formation of larger groups than majority.
Proposition 3 If nln(µ([θn+1,θn])) − ln(µ([0,θn+1])) ≥ 0 for any n ≥ 1,
then unanimity favors the formation of larger groups than majority.
Before giving the intuition behind Proposition 3, let us ﬁrst interpret the joint
condition on the indiﬀerence thresholds (θn)n=1,...,N and the distribution of
types µ. Suppose that µ is the uniform distribution, the condition then
states that the total cost of changing the status quo is decreasing in the
size of the group i.e., ncx(n) ≥ (n + 1)cx(n + 1). Equivalently, the cost per
individual to change the status quo is rapidly decreasing as the size of the
group increases.17 More generally, the condition implies that economies of
scale are growing as the size of the group increases; the rate of growth being
determined by the distribution µ. In turn, this rapid growth of economies
of scale implies that the expected gain to join the group oﬀsets the risk that
individuals in the group do not unanimously agree to change the status quo.
17In particular, it implies that limn→+∞ cx(n) = 0.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 19
It follows that the most comprehensive equilibrium with unanimity is the
indicator of [0,1], and therefore unanimity favors the formation of larger
groups than majority. This is the main intuition behind Proposition 3. The
next proposition complements Proposition 3: it states that unanimity leads
to the formation of more pro-active groups only if it favors the formation of
larger groups than majority.
Proposition 4 If the expected size of the group with unanimity is smaller
than the expected size of the group with majority, then majority favors the
change of status quo.
The intuition is again simple. If the expected size of the group is smaller with
unanimity than with majority, it means that individuals forming the group
under unanimity have lower valuations than those forming the group under
majority.18 Therefore, individuals forming the group under unanimity are
less likely to change the status quo. This is a selection eﬀect. Together with
Proposition 3, this suggests that unanimity induces more pro-active groups
than majority only if economies of scale are rapidly growing in the size of
the group.
To sum up, we have seen that not only unanimity might favor the forma-
tion of larger groups than majority, but also the formation of more pro-active
groups. Large economies of scale are necessary. For otherwise, majority fa-
vors the formation of more pro-active groups, although they might be of
smaller sizes (See example in Section 4). Finally, we might wonder whether
there is a monotone relationship between the governance of a group and
its size, composition, and inclination to change the status quo. Numerical
examples show that this is not the case.19
7 Extensions
In this section, we propose some extensions of the model and discuss the
robustness of our results.
Complete information. An important assumption of the model is that
the valuations (θi)i=1,...,N are private information of each individual. This
assumption is crucial for the mode of governance to matter. To see this,
18Remember θuna ≤ θmaj in any equilibrium.
19Matlab codes are available upon request.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 20
assume that types are commonly known and deﬁne C∗ := {i : θi ≥ θn∗}
with n∗ = argmaxn∈N(|{i : θi ≥ θn}| ≥ n) as the largest group whose all
members agree to change the status quo. We can then show that the strategy
proﬁle si = 1 for all i ∈ C∗, and si = 0 otherwise, is the most comprehensive
Nash equilibrium of our game.20 Moreover, this is regardless of the mode of
governance.
Entry and exit. An implicit assumption of the model is that members of
the group cannot exit the group after either observing how many individuals
join the group or the vote outcome. This assumption is reasonable if there is
a suﬃciently high cost to exit the group. However, our qualitative results are
not altered if individuals can exit the group. Indeed, note that if individuals
can exit the group after their initial decision to enter the group, then joining
the group at the initial stage is weakly dominant. An individual can always
exit the group later and gets his stand-alone payoﬀ. It follows that if exit
can only take place after the initial decision to enter the group (i.e., after
observing how many individuals have decided to join the group), then all
equilibria are equivalent to the ones analyzed in this paper. If, however,
individuals can exit the group after the vote, the equilibria are diﬀerent but
the same trade-oﬀ and qualitative results remain. To see this, note that
conditional on y being chosen, all individuals with types above θ1 exit the
group while the other types stay. Conditional on x being chosen, we clearly
have that all types above θ1 stay and all types below θN exit. It follows that
there exists a threshold θ∗ such that all individuals with types above θ∗ stay in
the group. Moreover, we can easily show that if µ(0,θN) = 0, then the most
comprehensive equilibrium consists of all individuals forming the group and
voting for x, regardless of the mode of governance. However, if µ(0,θN) > 0,
then the most comprehensive equilibrium under unanimity is the indicator
of [0,θ1] while it is the indicator of [θ∗,1] under majority. Majority thus
favors a change of status quo. And a suﬃcient condition for unanimity to
favor larger groups than majority is µ([0,θN]) > 1/2. This suggests that the
qualitative results of this paper are robust to the possibility of exit from the
20To see this, observe that |{i : θi ≥ θn
∗
}| = n∗. If not, we have |{i : θi ≥ θn
∗
}| = m >
n∗ implying that |{i : θi ≥ θm}| ≥ m, a contradiction with the deﬁnition of n∗. Individuals
in C∗ have clearly no incentives to deviate. As for individuals not in C∗, suppose that one
of them deviates. The size of the group is then n∗ + 1, and the deviation is proﬁtable to
player i only if θi > θn
∗+1, which is impossible by deﬁnition of n∗. The proof that is the
most comprehensive equilibrium is available upon request.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 21
group. A full-ﬂedged analysis of entry and exit is, nonetheless, left for future
research.
Many choices. Another important assumption of the model is that
the group has to take a unique decision. Instead, suppose that the group
has to take T decisions, sequentially. A more complicate trade-oﬀ emerges,
but the main intuitions are the same. On the one hand, an individual still
beneﬁts from economies of scale by participating in the group. On the other
hand, he still faces the risk that the group adopts a sequence of decisions
that diﬀers from the sequence of decisions the individual would take on his
own. Alternatively, suppose that after each vote, each member of the group
has the option to freely exit the group and each stand-alone individual has
the option to freely join the group. The group formation game is then the
ﬁnite repetition of the (constituent) game analyzed in the present paper.
And following the idea found in the literature on repeated games, we can
use equilibria of our game to construct equilibrium strategies of this new
repeated game.21
Multiple groups. As alluded in the introduction, the literature on ju-
risdictions and the local provision of public goods is closely related to the
present work. Following this literature (e.g., Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001)),
we deﬁne a (symmetric) free mobility equilibrium as a ﬁnite partition {Ck}K
k=1
of the space of valuations [0,1] such that the two following conditions hold:
1) for all θi ∈ Ck, E(θi,Ck) ≥ E(θi,Ck0) for all k0, and 2) E(θi,Ck) ≥
max(0,θibx − cx).22 In the deﬁnition, the ﬁrst condition states that the
expected payoﬀ of an individual i of valuation θi ∈ Ck is better oﬀ joining
the group Ck than any other group Ck0. The second condition simply states
that an individual is not compelled to participate in a group, and should
get at least his stand-alone payoﬀ E0(θi). Note that the deﬁnition allows for
21Assuming that valuations are independently drawn at each period t.
22The expected payoﬀ E(θi,Ck) is given by:
N X
n=1






















.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 22
the existence of several groups. What would be a free mobility equilibrium?
First, since payoﬀ functions satisfy a single crossing property, it is immedi-
ate to see that groups must be intervals. Second, assume that the mode of
governance is not unanimity and N > 2. Suppose that there exists a group
Ck such that Ck ∩ [0,θN] 6= ∅ and Ck 6⊆ [0,θN). Clearly, condition 2) of the
deﬁnition is violated for any θi ∈ Ck ∩ [0,θN). For those types, changing
the status quo is strictly dominated regardless of the size of the group and,
therefore, the mere possibility that the group Ck changes the status quo (i.e.,
takes action x) implies that their expected payoﬀ is strictly negative in the
group Ck. It follows that [0,θN) has to be a group, say C1. Next, consider the
group C2 = [θN,θ∗). By continuity of the payoﬀ function, we have that for
all valuations in C2 suﬃciently close to θN, their expected payoﬀ is strictly
negative, which again contradicts condition 2) of the deﬁnition. Therefore,
no free mobility equilibrium exists. In other words, it is impossible to orga-
nize individuals in groups such that all individuals receive their stand-alone
payoﬀs. However, if there are N = 2, {[0,θ2),[θ2,1]} is a free mobility equi-
librium: the ﬁrst group does not change the status quo while the second
does. For N = 2, this equilibrium is the unique non-trivial equilibrium of
the group formation game analyzed in this paper. Lastly, with unanimity,
it is easy to see that there exists a θ∗ ∈ (θN,θ1) such that {[0,θ∗),[θ∗,1]} is
a free mobility equilibrium with the group composed of the individuals with
the higher valuations being more likely to change the status quo. This last
equilibrium diﬀers from the one analyzed in the paper.
Finally, suppose that individuals can endogenously form several groups
or stand alone i.e., the strategy of an individual is a map from [0,1] to
{0,1,...,K} where “0” is interpreted as “stand alone”, “k” as “participate
in group k.” It is immediate to see that the equilibria analyzed in the present
paper survive. Indeed, it is a coordination game, and if each individual
conjectures that his opponents are using the equilibrium strategy found in
this paper i.e., s(θi) = 0 if θi / ∈ [θ,θ] and s(θi) = k if θi ∈ [θ,θ], then it
is a best reply to follow strategy s. Henceforth, most of our results remain
valid in this more general model allowing for multiple groups. However, there
might exist other equilibria. This is left for future research.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 23
8 Appendix





n=1 ϕ(n − 1,s)[αn−1(ω(n) − 1,s)max(0,θibx − cx(n))
+(
Xn−1
m=ω(n) αn−1(m,s))(θibx − cx(n))]
is strictly increasing in θi regardless of s, and thus strictly quasi-concave.
Deﬁne T := {θi ∈ [0,1] : θi < θ1}, as the set of types that choose action x in
a group of one or more individuals, and denote T c the complement of T in
[0,1]. In the sequel, we write E1(θi,·) for “ E1(θi,s) for any strategy function
s”.
Consider (θi,θ0
i) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] such that E1 (θi,·) ≥ max(0,θibx − cx)
E1 (θ0
i,·) ≥ max(0,θ0
ibx − cx), and any a ∈ (0,1). We shall show that
E
1 (aθi + (1 − a)θ
0
i,·) > max(0,(aθi + (1 − a)θ
0
i)bx − cx). (9)
First, if (θi,θ0
i) ∈ T × T, Eq. (9) is trivially satisﬁed since E1 is strictly
quasi-concave in θi. Second, if θi ∈ T, θ0
i ∈ T c, and aθi + (1 − a)θ0
i ∈ T, we
shall show that
E
1 (aθi + (1 − a)θ
0
i,·) > 0.
One again, this is trivially true by the strict quasi-concavity of E1. Third, if
θi ∈ T, θ0
i ∈ T c, and aθi + (1 − a)θ0
i ∈ T c, we shall show that
E
1 (aθi + (1 − a)θ
0
i,·) > (aθi + (1 − a)θ
0
i)bx − cx. (10)
To prove this last statement, we ﬁrst need a Lemma.
Lemma 4 For all θi ∈ T c, E1 (θi,·) − (θi∆x − cx) is decreasing in θi.
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the convex hull of {bx,...,(
XN−1





Finally, the slope of θibx−cx is bx, and thus E1 (θi,·)−(θibx−cx) is decreasing
in θi. 
By Lemma 4, it thus follows that (10) holds. Similarly, we can show that
if (θi,θ0
i) ∈ T c×T c, and aθi+(1 − a)θ0
i ∈ T c, (10) holds. This completes the
proof. 
Binomial formula. In this section, we give a result about binomial
sums for increasing ﬁnite sequences {an}N
n=1. i.e., sequences with a1 ≤ a2 ≤
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N−n−1 (n − Np).
For n < Np, we have an ≤ a[Np], and since n − Np < 0 for such n, it follows
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because an ≥ a[Np] and n − Np ≥ 0. Combining the two inequalities yields
f
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n−1 (1 − p)
N−n−1
= a[Np] (Np − Np) = 0,
which is the desired result. Note that if there is at least one strict inequality
between the an’s, a strict inequality for f0 (p) will follow. Moreover, if we
consider a decreasing sequence i.e., a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ aN, the reverse inequality
trivially holds.
Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the existence of at least one non-trivial equilibrium, we rely on
arguments from Index Theory. Note that we do not use usual ﬁxed point
arguments since we cannot guarantee that the domain of Γ(θ,θ) − (θ,θ)
is Σ. Remember that if N = 2, there is a non-trivial equilibrium with
(θ,θ) = (θ2,1). From now, assume N ≥ 3. (CHECK whether for unanimity
something diﬀerent must be said).
First, observe that a non-trivial equilibrium necessarily satisﬁes (θ,θ) ∈
T × T c ⊂ Σ (T c being the complement of T in [0,1]), with
T :=

θi ∈ [0,1] : θi < θ
1	
,
the set of types that choose action y whenever they stand alone. The proof
proceeds by contradiction. First, suppose that (θ,θ) ∈ T × T, then we have
E1(θ,θ,θ) = 0 from the deﬁnition of T and an equilibrium. Since E1 is in-
creasing in θi (see (4)), we then have E1(θ,θ,θ) > 0, a contradiction. Second,
suppose that (θ,θ) ∈ T c×T c, then we have E1(θ,θ,θ)−θbx−cx = 0 from the
deﬁnition of T c and an equilibrium. As already mentioned, E1(·,θ,θ)−E0 (·)
is decreasing in θi for θi ∈ T C (see Lemma 4), hence E1(θ,θ,θ)−θbx−cx > 0,
again a contradiction. Finally, if (θ,θ) = (0,1), it is trivially true. There-
fore, at a non-trivial equilibrium, we have θ < θ1 ≤ θ. This implies that
β(n,s) 6= 0 in any non-trivial equilibrium.Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 26
Second, we have θN ≤ θ at a non-trivial (undominated) equilibrium if
the mode of governance is not the unanimity. Note that since cx(N) < bx,
we have θN > 0. By contradiction, suppose that θN > θ at a non-trivial
equilibrium, hence all types θi ∈]θ,θN[ participate in the group. However, for
all types θi ∈]θ,θN[, we have E1(θi,θ,θ) < 0 = E0(θi) independently of θ since
for these types, action x is strictly dominated by y (i.e., θibx < cx(N)). Hence
θ ∈ [θN,θ1[. (In other words, E1(θi,s) < 0 for any θi ≤ pN at any non-trivial
equilibrium s with N ≥ 3.) Similarly, it is easy to see that, independently of
θ ∈ T, we have θ 6= θ1. It follows that a non-trivial equilibrium point (θ,θ)
necessarily belongs to [θN,θ1[×]θ1,1], an open subset of Σ.
Third, if the mode of governance is unanimity, we might have a non-
trivial equilibrium with θ < θN since types θi ∈ [θ,θN] can veto decision x
with probability 1. In other words, E1(θi,θ,θ) = 0 = E0(θi) for those types.
The last step in proving the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium consists
in proving the existence of a zero of Γ. To do so, we construct a mapping
(homotopy) h : [θN,θ1]×[θ1,1] → R2 that admits a unique zero in the interior
of its domain and that has the same degree than Γ, hence Γ admits a zero.23














Note that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of h is −1, hence is
of full rank, and the index of h is +1. It follows that h has a zero. More-
over, we have the following boundary conditions for h. limθ→θN h1(θ,θ) < 0,
limθ→θ1 h1(θ,θ) > 0, limθ→θ1 h2(θ,θ) > 0, and limθ→1 h2(θ,θ) < 0. As for
Γ, from the above observations, we have the following boundary conditions.
limθ→θN Γ1(θ,θ) ≤ 0, limθ→θ1 Γ1(θ,θ) ≥ 0, limθ→θ1 Γ2(θ,θ) ≥ 0.
In a technical appendix available on my webpage, I prove the following:
Corollary A Let f : int[0,1]n → Rn be a continuous mapping. If for
any x = (x1,...,xi,...,xn) ∈ [0,1]n such that xi = 0, fi(x) ≤ 0, for any
x = (x1,...,xi,...,xn) ∈ [0,1]n such that xi = 1, fi(x) ≥ 0, then f has a
zero in the interior of [0,1]n.
23Loosely speaking, the degree of a function at a 0 with respect to a bounded, open set
counts the solution in that set in a particular way. Two functions have the same degree at
0 if they do no point into opposites directions at the boundary. See Mass-Colell (1985).Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 27
We can then apply Corollary A to prove the existence of a zero of Γ.
More precisely, if limθ→1 Γ2(θ,θ) ≤ 0, then the existence follows directly
from Theorem A. If limθ→1 Γ2(θ,θ) ≥ 0, we have that θ = 1, and the proof
follows then by the Intermediate Value Theorem. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider two non-trivial equilibria, (θ,θ) and (θ
0,θ
0
), such that the two




We have to show that (θ
0,θ
0
) = (θ,θ). First, suppose that the mode of
governance is the unanimity i.e., ω(n) = n for n ∈ N, and without loss of
generality assume θ < θ
0 < θ < θ
0














since ϕ(n−1,θ,θ) = ϕ(n−1,θ
0,θ
0
) for all n ∈ {0,...,N −1}. Moreover, we
have µ(]max(θ,θn),θ[) ≤ µ(]max(θ
0,θn),θ
0
[) with at least one n for which
the inequality is strict, hence α(n−1,θ,θ) ≤ α(n−1,θ
0,θ
0
) with at least one n





0 ≤ θ for (θ
0,θ
0
















) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates α(·,θ,θ). 
Proof of Lemma 3
The probability to change the status quo is (µ([θN,1]))N with unanimity.
Since limn→∞ cx(n) = 0, for any ε > 0, there exists a N such that θN ∈
(0,ε) for any N > N. It implies that µ(θN,1) → 1 as N goes to inﬁnity.
For otherwise, µ is not absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. It follows that limN→∞(µ([θN,1]))N = 1. The probability that the






α(m,θmaj,1) < 1, (11)
which is bounded from above by 1 since θmaj > θN for any N. This completes
the proof. Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 28
Proof of Proposition 2
For any non-trivial equilibrium (θ,θ), conditionally on n individuals par-














that is, the probability that (N −n) individuals standing alone choose action
x (remember that θ ≥ θ1 > θ in a non-trivial equilibrium) and the probability
that the group chooses action x conditional on the mode of governance in a
group of n individuals. Moreover, the probability that exactly n individuals






































Now consider two non-trivial equilibria (θ
∗,θ
∗




µ(]θ,θ[). We can easily show that the ﬁrst term in Equation (12) is smaller
for the equilibrium (θ
∗,θ
∗
) than (θ,θ). As for the second term, the complex-
ity of the ﬁnite binomial sum of terms, which also depends on θ and θ, does
not make it possible to sign its variation. Nonetheless, it is bounded. As
N gets larger, the variation in the ﬁrst term dominates the variation in the




(θ,θ) such that µ(]θ
∗,θ
∗
[) > µ(]θ,θ[), a larger group is socially desirable. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that [θ,θ] is the most comprehensive equilibrium function for
unanimity with θ < 0. (Remember that θ ≤ θN.) We want to show that
there exists a θ∗ > θ such that [θ,θ∗] is also an equilibrium function under
the assumption stated in Proposition 3, thus contradicting the assumptionGroups and governance, June 18, 2007 29

























This is equivalent to
nln(µ(θ
n,θ













































is increasing, it fol-
lows from the Binomial formula that the ﬁrst line is positive. It is also easy
to check that the second line is positive. Moreover, it is strictly positive for
all θi > θ1. It follows then from the intermediate value theorem that there
exists a θ∗ > θ such [θ,θ∗] is an equilibrium. By repeating this argument, we
have that at the most comprehensive equilibrium for unanimity, θ = 1. Groups and governance, June 18, 2007 30




be, respectively, the equilibrium under unanimity and majority. Observe that
since the expected size of the group under unanimity is smaller than under
majority, we have θ ≤ θ
∗ ≤ θ ≤ θ
∗




























































Clearly, if µ(]θ,θ[) = µ]θ
∗,θ
∗
[, Proposition 4 follows. Next, if the expected
size µ(]θ,θ[) is lower than µ]θ
∗,θ
∗
[, we can show that the expected probability
to change the status quo is reduced, and this completes the proof. 
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